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Angola, 1975 to 1980s : The
Great Powers Poker Game

It is spring 1975. Saigon has just fallen. The
last of the Americans are fleeing for their lives. Fallout from Watergate hangs
heavy in the air in the United States. The Pike Committee of the House of
Representatives is investigating CIA foreign covert activities. On the Senate
side, the Church Committee is doing the same. And the Rockefeller Commission
has set about investigating the Agency’s domestic activities. The morning
papers bring fresh revelations about CIA and FBI misdeeds.

The CIA and its influential supporters warn
that the crescendo of disclosures will inhibit the Agency from carrying out the
functions necessary for national security.

At CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, they
are busy preparing for their next secret adventure: Angola.

To undertake a military operation at such a
moment, the reasons, one would imagine, must have been both compelling and
urgent. Yet, in the long history of American interventions it would be
difficult to find one more pointless or with less to gain for the United States
or the foreign people involved.

The origin of our story dates back to the
beginning of the 1960s when two political movements in Angola began to oppose
by force the Portuguese colonial government: the MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto,
and the FNLA, led by Holden Roberto. (The latter group was known by other names
in its early years, but for simplicity will be referred to here only as FNLA.)

The United States, not normally in the
business of supporting “liberation” movements, decided that inasmuch as
Portugal would probably be unable to hold on to its colony forever, establishing
contact with a possible successor regime might prove beneficial. For reasons
lost in the mists of history, the United States, or at least someone in the
CIA, decided that Roberto was their man and around 1961 or ‘62 onto the Agency
payroll he went.

At the same time, and during the ensuing
years, Washington provided their NATO ally, the Salazar dictatorship in Lisbon,
with the military aid and counter-insurgency training needed to suppress the
rebellion. John Marcum, an American scholar who walked 800 miles through Angola
into the FNLA guerrilla camps in the early 1960s, has written:

By January 1962 outside observers could watch
Portuguese planes bomb and strafe African villages, visit the charred remains
of towns like Mbanza M’Pangu and M’Pangala, and copy the data from 750-point
napalm bomb casings from which the Portuguese had not removed the labels marked
“Property U.S. Air Force”.

The Soviet Union, which had also given some
support to Roberto, embraced Neto instead in 1964, arguing that Roberto had
helped the discredited Moise Tshombe in the Congo and curtailed his own
guerrilla operations in Angola under pressure from Washington. Before long,
another movement, UNITA by name, entered the picture and China dealt itself
into The Great Powers Poker Game, lending support to UNITA and FNLA.

Although MPLA may have been somewhat more
genuine in its leftist convictions than FNLA or UNITA, there was little to
distinguish any of the three groups from each other ideologically. When the
press made any distinction amongst them it was usually to refer to MPLA as
“Marxist”, but this was ill-defined, if defined at all, and simply took on a
media life of its own. Each of the groups spoke of socialism and employed
Marxist rhetoric when the occasion called for it, and genuflected to other gods
when it did not. In the 1960s, each of them was perfectly willing to accept
support from any country willing to give it without excessive strings attached.
Neto, for example, went to Washington in December 1962 to put his case before
the American government and press and to emphasize the fallacy of categorizing
the MPLA as communist. During the following two years, Roberto appealed for aid
to the Soviet Union, Cuba, China, Algeria, and Nasser’s Egypt. Later, Jonas
Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, approached the same countries (with the exception
perhaps of the Soviet Union) as well as North Vietnam, and accepted military
training for his men from North Korea.

Each group was composed predominantly of
members of a particular tribe; each tried to discourage aid or recognition
being given to the others; they each suffered from serious internal splits and
spent as much time fighting each other as they did the Portuguese army. The
Vietcong they were not.

Author Jonathan Kwitny has observed that the
three tribal nations had a long history of fighting each other …

It was not until the latter part of the
twentieth century, however, that Dr. Henry Kissinger and other political
scientists discovered that the real reason the Mbundu, the Ovimbundu, and the
Kongo had been fighting off and on for the past 500 years was that the Mbundu
were “Marxist” and the Ovimbundu and Kongo were “pro-Western”.

That the CIA’s choosing of its ally was
largely an arbitrary process is further underlined by a State Department cable
to its African Embassies in 1963 which stated: “U.S. policy is not, repeat not,
to discourage [an] MPLA … move toward West and not to choose between these two

Even in 1975, when the head of the CIA,
William Colby, was asked by a congressional committee what the differences were
between the three contesting factions, he responded:

They are all independents. They are all for
black Africa. They are all for some fuzzy kind of social system, you know,
without really much articulation, but some sort of let’s not be exploited by
the capitalist nations.

And when asked why the Chinese were backing
the FNLA or UNITA, he stated: “Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the
simplest answer.”

“It sounds,” said Congressman Aspin, “like
that is why
we are doing it.”

“It is,” replied Colby.

Nonetheless, the committee, in its later
report, asserted that in view of Colby’s statement, “The U.S.’s expressed
opposition to the MPLA is puzzling”.

Finally, it is instructive to note that all
three groups were denounced by the Portuguese as communists and terrorists.

Before April 1974, when a coup in Portugal
ousted the dictatorship, the aid given to the Angolan resistance movements by
their various foreign patrons was sporadic and insignificant, essentially a
matter of the patrons keeping their hands in the game. The coup, however,
raised the stakes, for the new Portuguese government soon declared its
willingness to grant independence to its African colonies.

In an agreement announced on 15 January 1975,
the three movements formed a transitional government with elections to be held
in October and formal independence to take place the following month.

Since 1969, Roberto had been on a
$10,000-a-year retainer from the CIA. On 22 January, the Forty Committee of the
National Security Council in Washington authorized the CIA to pass $300,000 to
Roberto and the FNLA for “various political action activities, restricted to
non-military objectives.” Such funds of course can always free up other funds
for military uses.

In March, the FNLA, historically the most
warlike of the groups, attacked MPLA headquarters and later gunned down 51
unarmed, young MPLA recruits. These incidents served to spark what was to be a
full-scale civil war, with UNITA aligning itself with FNLA against MPLA. The
scheduled elections would never take place.

Also in March, the first large shipment of
arms reportedly arrived from the Soviet Union for the MPLA. The House
investigating committee subsequently stated that “Later events have suggested
that this infusion of US aid [the $300,000], unprecedented and massive in the
underdeveloped colony, may have panicked the Soviets into arming their MPLA

The Soviets may have been as much influenced
by the fact that China had sent a huge arms package to the FNLA the previous
September and had dispatched over one hundred military advisers to neighboring
Zaire to train Roberto’s soldiers only a month after the coup in Portugal.

The CIA made its first major weapons shipment
to the FNLA in July 1975. Thus, like the Russians and the Chinese, the United
States was giving aid to one side of the Angolan civil war on a level far
greater than it had ever provided during the struggle against Portuguese

The United States was directly involved in the
civil war to a marked degree. In addition to training Angolan combat units, US
personnel did considerable flying between Zaire and Angola carrying out
reconnaissance and supply missions, and the CIA spent over a million dollars on
an ambitious mercenary program.  Several reports appeared in the US press
stating that many American mercenaries were fighting in Angola against the MPLA
– from “scores” to “300” – and that many others were being recruited and
trained in the United States to join them. But John Stockwell, the head of the
CIA’s Angola task force, puts the number of American mercenaries who actually
made it to Angola at only 24. The CIA was also directly financing the arming of
British mercenaries.  (The mercenaries included amongst their number the
well-known Englishman and psychopath George Cullen who lined up 14 of his
fellow soldiers-of-fortune and shot them all dead because they had mistakenly
attacked the wrong side.)

Subsequently, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger informed the Senate that “the CIA is not involved” in the recruitment
of mercenaries for Angola.

There were also well over a hundred CIA
officers and American military advisers scurrying about Angola, Zaire, Zambia
and South Africa helping to direct the military operations and practicing their
propaganda skills. Through recruited journalists representing major news
services, the Agency was able to generate international coverage for false
reports of Soviet advisers in Angola. One CIA story, announced to the press by
UNITA, was that 20 Russians and 35 Cubans had been captured. Another
fabrication concerned alleged rapes committed by Cuban soldiers in Angola; this
was elaborated to include their capture, trial, and execution, complete with
photos of the young women killing the Cubans who had raped them.

Both stories were reported widely in the
American and British press and elsewhere. Some of the major newspapers, such as
the New
York Times
, Washington Post, and The Guardian of
London, were careful to point out that the only source of the information was UNITA
and their articles did not attempt to ascribe any special credence to the
reports. But this could not of course prevent the placing of seeds of belief in
the minds of readers already conditioned to believe the worst about communists.

The disinformation campaign took place within
the United States as well. FNLA delegates came to New York in September to
lobby for support at the UN and with the New York press, distributing as they
went copies of a “white paper” on the Angolan conflict prepared at CIA
headquarters but made to look like it was produced in Zaire, French and all.  John
Stockwell described the paper as sometimes “false to the point of being
ludicrous” and other times “simply inaccurate”.

Afterward, representatives of UNITA went to
Washington and presented to members of Congress, the State Department, theWhite
House and the media, verbal reports about the situation in Angola which were
the product of briefings given them by their CIA case officers.

In January 1976, William Colby sat before the
Senate investigating committee and solemnly assured the Senators:

We have taken particular caution to ensure
that our operations are focused abroad and not at the United States to
influence the opinion of the American people about things from the CIA point of

There was virtually no important aspect of the
Angolan intervention which Colby, Kissinger, and other high officials did not
misrepresent to Congress and the media.

The odds never favored a military victory for
the US-backed forces in Angola, particularly in the absence of a relatively
large-scale American commitment which, given the political atmosphere, was not
in the cards. The MPLA was the most organized and best led of the three
factions and early on controlled the capital city of Luanda, which housed
almost the entire governmental machinery. Yet, for no reason, apparently, other
than anti-Soviet spite, the United States was unwilling to allow a negotiated
settlement. When Savimbi of UNITA sent out feelers to the MPLA in September
1975 to discuss a peaceful solution he was admonished by the CIA. Similarly,
the following month when an MPLA delegation went to Washington to once again
express their potential friendliness to the United States, they received a cool
reception, being seen only by a low-level State Department official.

In November MPLA representatives came to
Washington to plead for the release of two Boeing jet airliners which their
government had paid for but which the State Department would not allow to
beexported. John Stockwell relates the unusual development that the MPLA men
were accompanied by Bob Temmons, who until shortly before had been the head of
the CIA station in Luanda, as well as by the president of Boeing. While the two
Angolans and the man from Boeing petitioned the State Department, the CIA man
made known to Agency headquarters that he had come to share the view of the US
Consul General in Luanda “that the MPLA was best qualified to run the country,
that it was not demonstrably hostile to the United States, and that the United
States should make peace with it as quickly as possible.”

The State Department’s response to the MPLA
representatives was simple: the price for any American co-operation with the
Angolan government was Soviet influence out, US influence in.

At one time or another almost two dozen
countries, East and West, felt the urge to intervene in the conflict. Principal
amongst these were the United States, China, South Africa and Zaire on the side
of FNLA/UNITA, and the Soviet Union, Cuba, the Congo Republic and Katangese
troops (Zairian rebels) supporting MPLA. The presence of South African forces
on their side cost the United States and its Angolan allies dearly in support
from other countries, particularly in Africa. Yet, South Africa’s participation
in the war had been directly solicited by the United States.  In sharp
contrast to stated American policy, the CIA and the National Security Agency
had been collaborating with Pretoria’s intelligence service since the 1960s and
continued to do so in regard to Angola. One of the principal focuses of the
intelligence provided by the US to South Africa was the African National
Congress, the leading anti-apartheid organization which had been banned and
exiled.  In 1962, the South African police arrested ANC leader Nelson
Mandela based on information as to his whereabouts and disguise provided them
by CIA officer Donald Rickard. Mandela spent almost 28 years in prison.

In 1977, the Carter administration banned the
sharing of intelligence with South Africa, but this was largely ignored by the
American intelligence agencies. Two years earlier, the CIA had set up a covert
mechanism whereby arms were delivered to the South Africans; this practice, in
violation of US law, continued until at least 1978, and a portion of the arms
were more than likely put to use in Angola. South Africa in turn helped to
ferry American military aid from Zaire into Angola.

In fairness to the CIA, it must be pointed out
that its people were not entirely oblivious or insensitive to what South Africa
represented. The Agency was very careful about letting its black officers into
the Angola program.

A congressional cutoff of aid to the
FNLA/UNITA, enacted in January 1976, hammered a decisive nail into their
coffin. Congressmen did not yet know the full truth about the American
operation, but enough of the public dumbshow had been exposed to make them
incensed at how Kissinger, Colby, et al. had lied to their faces. The
consequence was one of the infrequent occasions in modern times that the US
Congress has exercised a direct and pivotal influence upon American foreign
policy. In the process, it avoided the slippery slope to another Vietnam, on
top of which stood Henry Kissinger and the CIA with shoes waxed.

By February, the MPLA, with indispensable help
from Cuban troops and Soviet military equipment, had all but routed their
opponents. The Cuban presence in Angola was primarily a direct response to
South African attacks against the MPLA. Wayne Smith, director of the State
Department’s Office of Cuban Affairs from 1977 to 1979, has written that “in August
and October [1975] South African troops invaded Angola with full U.S.
knowledge. No Cuban troops were in Angola prior to this intervention.”

Savimbi at this time again considered reaching
an understanding with the MPLA. The response from Washington was: Keep
fighting. Kissinger personally promised UNITA continued support if they
maintained their resistance, knowing full well that there was no more support
to give. During the two weeks that Savimbi waited for his answer, he lost 600
men in a single battlefield. Yet, incredibly, less than two months before, the
Secretary of State had stated: “We are not opposed to the MPLA as such … We can
live with any of the factions in Angola.” The man was wholly obsessed with
countering Soviet moves anywhere on the planet – significant or trivial, real
or imagined, fait accompli or anticipated. He was perhaps particularly driven
in this case, for as he later wrote: “Angola represents the first time that the
Soviets have moved militarily at long distance to impose a regime of their

If this seems far removed from how the
academics tell us American foreign policy is made, it’s still more plausible
than the other explanation commonly advanced for the policy in Angola, viz: it
was done to please Sese Seko Mobutu, the head of Zaire, characterized as
America’s most important ally/client in Africa, if not in the Third World. (Zaire
was home to the CIA’s largest station in Africa.) Mobutu desired an Angolan
government he could sway, primarily to prevent Angola being used as a sanctuary
by his arch foes, the rebels from Katanga province in Zaire. Accordingly, the
Zairian leader committed his US-equipped armed forces into combat in Angola, on
the side of the FNLA, for Holden Roberto happened to be a relation of his,
although Roberto and the FNLA had little else going for them. As Professor
Gerald Bender, a leading American authority on Angola, testified before
Congress in 1978:

Although the United States has supported the
FNLA in Angola for 17 years, it is virtually impossible to find an American
official, scholar or journalist, who is familiar with that party, who will
testify positively about its organization or leadership. After a debate with a
senior State Department official at the end of the Angolan civil war, I asked
him why the United States ever bet on the FNLA. He replied, “I’ll be damned if
I know; I have never seen a single report or memo which suggests that the FNLA
has any organization, solid leaders, or an ideology which we could count on.”
Even foreign leaders who have supported Holden Roberto, such as General Mobutu,
agree with that assessment. When asked by a visiting U.S. Senator if he thought
Roberto would make a good leader for Angola, Mobutu replied, “Hell no!”

Kissinger himself told the House investigating
committee that promoting the stability of Mobutu was one of the prime reasons
for the American policy in Angola. Yet, even if this were one of Kissinger’s
rare truthful remarks about the Angola situation, and even if this could be a
valid justification for serious intervention in a civil war ina third country,
his statement challenges, if it does not defeat, comprehension; for in June
1975, a month before the United States shipped its first major arms package to
the FNLA, Mobutu had accused the US of plotting his overthrow and assassination,
whereupon he expelled the American ambassador (see Zaire chapter).

The Secretary of State, never at a loss for
the glib line custom-made for his immediate audience, also told Israeli
officials that failure to stop the Russians in Angola “could encourage Arab
countries such as Syria to run risks that could lead to a new attack on Israel,
backed up by the Russians.”

The American ambassador to the United Nations,
Daniel Moynihan, did not greatly enhance the level of discussion when he
declared that if the United States did not step in “the Communists would take
over Angola and will thereby considerably control the oil shipping lanes from
the Persian Gulf to Europe. They will be next to Brazil. They will have a large
chunk of Africa, and the world will be different in the aftermath if they
succeed.”  A truly baroque train of thought, and another example of what
cold- war conditioning could do to an otherwise intelligent and educated

With only a change in place names, similar
geo-political- domino theories have been put forth to give a veneer of
rationality to so many American interventions. In this case, as in the others
where the “communists” won, nothing of the sort ensued.

“In all respect to Kissinger,” Jonathan Kwitny
has written, “one really has to question the sanity of someone who looks at an
ancient tribal dispute over control of distant coffee fields and sees in it a
Soviet threat to the security of the United States.”

The MPLA in power was restricted by the same
domestic and international economic realities which the FNLA or UNITA would
have faced. Accordingly, it discouraged union militancy, dealt sternly with
strikes, exhorted the workers to produce more, entered into commercial
contracts with several multinationals, and did not raise the hammer and sickle
over the president’s palace. The MPLA urged Gulf Oil Co. to continue its
exclusive operation in Cabinda province and guaranteed the safety of the
American corporation’s employees while the fighting was still heavy. Gulf was
completely amenable to this offer, but the CIA and the State Department put
pressure on the company to discontinue its royalty payments to the MPLA, thus
jeopardizing the entire oil venture in a way that the “Marxist” government
never did. One aspect of this pressure was a threat by Kissinger to open an
investigation of international bribery by the company. Gulf compromised by
putting its payments into an escrow bank account until the civil war came to an
end of sorts a few months later, at which time payments to the MPLA were

Contrary to accepted Western belief, Cuba did
not enter the Angolan war as a Soviet surrogate. John Stockwell has noted that
after the war the CIA “learned that Cuba had not been ordered into action by
the Soviet Union” but that “the Cuban leaders felt compelled to intervene for
their own ideological reasons.” In 1977, the New York magazine Africa Report
stated that “The Cubans have supported [MPLA leader Neto’s] pragmatic approach
toward Western investment and his attempts to maintain a foreign policy of
non-alignment.” The magazine also reported that on 27 May the Angolan
government had announced that, aided by Cuban troops, it had crushed a
rebellion by a faction of the MPLA whose leader claimed to have Soviet support.

The civil war in Angola did not actually come
to an end in 1976 as it appeared to, for the fighting lingered on
intermittently, sometimes moderately, sometimes ferociously.

In 1984 a confidential memorandum smuggled out
of Zaire revealed that the United Statesand South Africa had met in November
1983 to discuss destabilization of the Angola government. Plans were drawn up
to supply more military aid to UNITA (the FNLA was now defunct) and discussions
were held on ways to implement a wide range of tactics: unify the
anti-government movements, stir up popular feeling against the government,
sabotage factories and transport systems, seize strategic points, disrupt joint
Angola-Soviet projects, undermine relations between the government and the
Soviet Union and Cuba, bring pressure to bear on Cuba to withdraw its troops,
sow divisions in the ranks of the MPLA leadership, infiltrate agents into the
Angolan army, and apply pressure to stem the flow of foreign investments into

The United States branded the document a
forgery, but UNITA’s representative in Washington would neither confirm nor
deny that the meeting took place. He stated, however, that UNITA had “contacts
with US officials at all levels on a regular basis”.

The aim of the operation, according to the
memorandum, was to force part of the Angolan leadership to negotiate with
UNITA, precisely what Washington had successfully discouraged years earlier.

A month after the reported US-South Africa
meeting, the UN Security Council censured South Africa for its military
operations in Angola, and endorsed Luanda’s right to reparations. Only the
United States, abstaining, did not support the resolution.

In August 1985, after a three-year battle with
Congress, the Reagan administration won a repeal of the 1976 prohibition
against US military aid to rebel forces in Angola. Military assistance began to
flow to UNITA overtly as well as covertly. In January 1987, Washington
announced that it was providing the rebels with Stinger missiles and other
anti-aircraft weaponry. Three months earlier, Jonas Savimbi had spoken before
the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France in an appeal for support.
Following his talk, however, a plenary session of the Parliament criticized
American support for the guerrilla leader and passed a resolution which described
UNITA as a “terrorist organization which supports South Africa.”

Finally, in September 1992, elections were
held, but when it became apparent that the MPLA would be the winner in a run-off
– in polling which the UN certified to be free and fair – Savimbi refused to
accept the result. He ended a year-old cease-fire and launched one of UNITA’s
largest, most sustained offensives of the war, still being supplied by South
Africa, and, in recent years, by American “private” airlines and “relief”
organizations with interesting histories such as previous contacts to the
Nicaraguan contras.

In May 1993, Washington finally recognized the
Angolan government. In January, just before the Clinton administration took
over, a senior State Department official had declared: “Unita is exactly like
the Khmer Rouge: elections and negotiations are just one more method of
fighting a war; power is all.”

The war – which had taken more than 300,000
lives – was still raging in 1994, continuing to produce widespread hunger and
what is said to be the highest amputee rate in the world, caused by the
innumerable land mines.


  1. New York
    , 25 September 1975; 19 December 1975.
  2. John A.
    Marcum, “The Angolan Revolution,” Vol. I, 1950-1962 (MIT Press, Cambridge,
    Mass., 1969) pp. 229-30.
  3. New York
    , 17 December 1964, p. 14.
  4. Comparison
    of the three groups: a) Jonathan Kwitny, “Endless Enemies: The Making of
    an Unfriendly World” (New York, 1984) chapter 9; b) Marcum, Vol. II,
    1962-1976 (1978) pp. 14-15, 132, 172 and elsewhere; c) Basil Davidson, “In
    the Eye of the Storm: Angola’s People” (London, 1972) passim; d) Ernest
    Harsch and Tony Thomas, “Angola: The Hidden History of Washington’s War”
    (New York, 1976) passim. International appeals for support made by Roberto
    and Savimbi: see also New York Times, 4 January
    1964, p. 15; Kwitny, p. 136; Declassified Documents Reference System, 1977
    volume, document 210D (cable, 17 July 1964, US embassy Congo to State
  5. Kwitny, pp.
  6. State
    Department Circular 92, 16 July 1963, cited in Marcum II, p. 16.
  7. Hearings
    before the House Select Committee on Intelligence (The Pike Committee)
    published in “CIA – The Pike Report” (Nottingham, England, 1977) p. 218;
    hereafter referred to as Pike Report. (See Notes: Iraq for further
  8. Ibid., p.
  9. New York
    , 25 September 1975; 19 December.
  10. Pike Report,
    p. 199, the words in quotes are those of the Pike Committee; the date
    comes from John Stockwell, “In Search of Enemies” (New York, 1978) p. 67.
    Stockwell was a CIA officer and head of the Agency’s Angola task force.
  11. Stockwell,
    pp. 67-8; Marcum II, pp. 257-8 (he cites several international press
  12. New York
    , 25 September 1975.
  13. Pike Report,
    p. 199.
  14. Stockwell,
    p. 67.
  15. New York
    , 12 December 1975; Harsch and Thomas, p. 100, citing* CBS-TV
    News*, 17 December 1975, and Senator John Tunney, 6 January 1976.
  16. New York
    , 16 July 1978, p. 1
  17. Interview of
    Stockwell by author.) However, Holden Roberto was using CIA money, with
    the Agency’s tacit approval, to recruit many other mercenaries – over 100
    British plus a scattering of French and Portuguese. [[Stockwell, pp.
    223-4; see also Harsch and Thomas, pp. 99-100.
  18. Chapman
    Pincher, “Inside Story: A Documentary of the Pursuit of Power” (London,
    1978) p. 20
  19. Stockwell,
    p. 225.
  20. New York
    , 16 July 1978, referring to Kissinger’s statement of 29
    January 1976.
  21. Stockwell,
    pp. 162, 177-8, plus interview of Stockwell by author.
  22. Ibid., pp.
  23. The capture
    of Russians and Cubans story appeared in the press 22 November 1975; the
    rape story, 12 March 1976.
  24. Stockwell,
    p. 196.
  25. San
    Francisco Chronicle
    , 9 May 1978.
  26. Stockwell,
    pp. 196-8.
  27. Foreign and
    Military Intelligence, Book 1, Final Report of the Select Committee to
    Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US
    Senate), 26 April 1976, p. 129.
  28. Stockwell,
    p. 193.
  29. Ibid., pp.
    205-6 (“Bob Temmons” is probably a pseudonym); after the war ended, the
    State Department did release the planes to Angola.
  30. Newsweek
    (International Edition), 17 May 1976, p. 23, implicitly admitted to by
    South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster.
  31. New York
    , 16 July 1978, p. 1; 23 July 1986, p. 1; Stockwell, pp. 208,
    218; Stephen Talbot, “The CIA and BOSS: Thick as Thieves” in Ellen Ray, et
    al., eds., “Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa” (New Jersey, 1979) pp. 266-75
    (BOSS is the South African Bureau of State Security); Bob Woodward, “VEIL:
    The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987” (New York, 1987), p. 269.
  32. The
    (London), 15 August 1986; The Times (London) 4 August
    1986, p. 10.
  33. New York
    , 25 March 1982, p. 7, citing a report of the House Foreign
    Affairs Committee.
  34. Stockwell,
    p. 209.
  35. Ibid., p.
  36. Stockwell,
    pp. 216-17 discusses how this came about.
  37. Wayne S.
    Smith, “Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy”, Foreign Policy
    (Washington, D.C.) Fall 1982, p. 170.
  38. Stockwell,
    pp. 234-5.
  39. New York
    , 24 December 1975, p 7.
  40. Henry
    Kissinger, “American Foreign Policy” (New York, 1977, third edition), p.
  41. See, for
    example, New
    York Times
    , 25 September 1975.
  42. Hearings
    before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on International
    Relations, 25 May 1978, p. 7.
  43. Pike Report,
    p. 200.
  44. New York
    , 9 January 1976, p. 3.
  45. Washington
    , 18 December 1975, p. A23.
  46. Kwitny, p.
  47. Harsch and
    Thomas, pp. 82-91; New York Times, 8 February
    1981, IV, p. 5.
  48. Stockwell,
    pp. 203-4, 241; plus interview of Stockwell by author.
  49. Stockwell,
    p. 172.
  50. Galen Hull,
    “Internationalizing the Shaba Conflict”, *Africa Report *(New York)
    July-August 1977, p. 9. For further discussion of possible Soviet
    connection to the rebellion and the Russian attitude toward Angola, see
    Jonathan Steele, “Soviet Relations with Angola and Mozambique” in Robert
    Cassen, ed., Soviet Interests in the Third World (Published by Sage for
    the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1985), p. 290.
  51. The
    Observer (
    London), 22 January 1984.
  52. The
    (London), 21 December 1983.
  53. The
    (London), 23 October 1986, p. 8; the vote in the European
    Parliament was 152-150.
  54. The
    Guardian *(London), 25 June 1990, p. 10; Sharon Beaulaurier, “Profiteers
    Fuel War in Angola”, 
    Covert Action Quarterly* (Washington,
    DC), No. 45, Summer 1993, pp. 61-65.
  55. New York
    , 17 January 1993, IV, p. 5.

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