A nuclear
weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear
reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both
reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of
matter; a modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than a thousand
kilograms can produce an explosion comparable to the detonation of more than a
billion kilograms of conventional high explosive.

Even small
nuclear devices can devastate a city. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of
mass destruction, and their use and control has been a major aspect of
international policy since their debut.

Search for Confined Fireballs in the Atmosphere
[35 Pages, 722k]

Air Force
Search & Recovery Assessment of the 1958 Savannah, GA B-47 Accident [13

Report on the Restricted Data Program: Calendar Year 2000 [35 Pages]

Department of Defense Plan
for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to
Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

of Nuclear Attack on Freight Transportation Systems: Interactions and
Comparisons Among Modes
[54 pages, 2.85MB] – The operations and
equipment used in transferring vehicle loads between two vehicles or between a
vehicle and a terminal are examined for seven different classes of cargo. For
each of these classes, the usual method of load transfer is discussed, and
expedient methods that could be used in a postattack situation are suggested.
St. Louis, Missouri is used to illustrate the problem of moving cargo through a
damaged area after a nuclear attack. Several alternative methods of moving
cargo via multiple transportation modes are analyzed, and a simple procedure
for determining the minimum-time route among the alternatives is proposed. The
transportation resources required to deliver the minimum supplies for survivor
support in the St. Louis area are analyzed for different mixes of trains and
trucks and for movements of the supplies over a range of distances. A general
summary of the vulnerability of each transportation mode to nuclear attack is
provided, and the remedial actions that might be taken in the preattack period
to enhance postattack capability are discussed.

from Reactions in Nuclear Weapons, 29 June 1963
 [ 87
Pages, 2.30MB ] – This paper treats the emissions from the reactions
occurring in nuclear weapons, specifically the neutrons and electrons emitted
during the course of a nuclear explosion.

Response to a Domestic Nuclear Attack (Counterproliferation Papers, Future
Warfare Series, Number 46)
[36 pages, 300 KB] – The United States government
needs to plan for and prepare against terrorist attacks. Terrorism, when
combined with weapons of mass destruction, increases the planning complexity.
In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the government will need to conduct
consequence management in the affected areas, govern the non-affected areas,
and prevent future attacks. This paper examines what actions, following a
nuclear terrorist attack on domestic soil, produce the broadest and deepest
results and what options the President has to address such a national
emergency. The federal government must address the national effects caused by
the attack itself as well as the anticipated results caused by communities
enacting protective measures at the detriment of their neighbors. To produce
the list of coordinated actions and options, this paper uses a scenario where a
terrorist loads a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon into a truck, drives it to the
nation’s capital, and detonates it. After detonation, the government must
attempt to mitigate the weapon’s real and perceived effects. A review of the
mitigating responses reveals that some actions are nearly impossible without
prior planning and coordination. Additionally, the government must operate
within a framework of constitutionally granted authorities. Continuity of
government is assumed sufficient to exercise command and control and is beyond
the scope of this paper. It is also beyond the scope of this paper to present
more than a cursory overview of preventing a subsequent attack.

About Fallout [8 Pages]

Yields [31 Pages]
– This document took just about 11 years to obtain! The
original request was filed in December of 1996, and the document finally
arrived in November of 2007.

on DOE’s Requirements for Protecting and Controlling Classified Documents [8

Nuclear Radiation From Low Yield Fission Weapons [44 Pages]

Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [28 Pages]

Letter P.T.
Cullen dated 4/22/49 [2 Pages]

Local Environment Resulting from a Massive Nuclear Attack on Whiteman Air Force
Base, 1980
[54 Pages, 2.02MB] – The study examines the potential blast
and fallout damage that would be sustained by the 15 counties surrounding the
Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri following a nuclear attack against the
associated Minuteman missile silos. The study also provides recommendations
concerning the shelters that would be required to protect the population of
these 15 counties from blast effects and heavy fallout. The study was performed
in consonance with the new emphasis that FEMA (Federal Emergency Management
Agency) is giving to nuclear civil protection in counterforce areas. It is
intended to be a prototype for analyses of areas containing other U.S.
counterforce targets, notably the other five Minuteman wings, the Titan
missiles, the Strategic Air Command bases, and the strategic submarine bases.

Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb [76 Pages]

Consequences of Nuclear Warfare
[122 Pages] – The dramatic technological,
social, and economic progress of the twentieth century has yet toprevent the
use of armed conflict to resolve political differences among nations. As those
of usin military medicine prepare to support our forces into the next century,
we must continually beready for the many challenges presented by modern

Attack on U.S. Space-Based Assets [140 Pages]

Nuclear Crash: The
U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks [179 Pages]

Nuclear Deterrence [87

Nuclear South Asia
[71 Pages]

Charioteer, Musketeer, Touchstone, Cornerstone, Aqueduct, Sculpin and Julin
[494 Pages]




Preparedness and Post-Attack U.S. Economic Recovery: A State-of-the-Art
Assessment and Selected Annotated Bibliography, Volume 1
, October
1979 [341 Pages, 14.7MB] – This report contains an assessment of the
state-of-the-art of modeling and analysis for civil preparedness and management

the post-attack U.S. economy. This evaluation was derived from a large volume
of related literature. A selected annotated bibliography of over 100 entries
follows a state-of-the-art assessment.

the U.S. Economy in a Post-Attack Environment: A System Dynamics Model of
Viability, Volume 2
, November 1979 [77 Pages, 3.2MB] – The
primary objective of this study is to determine if post-attack viability (or
collapse) is automatic for a given system, or if management actions can
influence the outcome. In investigating this problem, the approach focuses on
exploring the structure of a post-attack system for instabilities, identifying
the processes that could lead to collapse, and then evaluating if and how
alternative post-attack management policies can mitigate the effects of those

for Accelerating Economic Recovery after Nuclear Attack. Volume 3
, July
1979 [122 Pages, 5.92MB] – The United States may fail to exploit to the fullest
its potential for economic recovery following a nuclear attack because failures
in post-attack management in both the political and the economic sectors. This
report looks at possible adjustments in our continually evolving peacetime
management systems, adjustments which might contribute substantially to
post-attack recovery at little peacetime cost. The post-attack considerations
addressed include making government more effective in bringing about economic
recovery and, very importantly, making sure that government continues as
government, i.e., that we do not sink into anarchy. Five broad categories of
adjustments are discussed.

Casualty Study, July 1968
[318 Pages, 11.3MB] – This investigation has
resulted in the development of a computer code (SEP – Shelter Evaluation
Program) which predicts casualties of personnel when subjected to the initial
effects of a nuclear weapon. Conditions for both sheltered and unsheltered
personnel were considered. Available casualty data were analyzed and functional
relationships between casualty and appropriate weapon effects were
approximated. Analytic models relating the weapon effects to these casualty
functions were also developed for SEP Code. A validation of the code was
performed using existing Hiroshima data. Finally, results are presented for a
range of construction and weapon parameters to illustrate how SEP Code may be
easily utilized to study shelter effectiveness in terms of added survivors.

for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (8/23/1974)

Fall-Out and Radex Plots [55 Pages]

of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against
Clandestine Nuclear Attack
[59 Pages, 1.1MB] – The DSB addressed this threat
in previous studies conducted in 1997 (also chaired by Richard Wagner) and
1999/2000 (chaired by Roger Hagengruber). Much has changed since then. The 11
Sept. 2001 attacks demonstrated the intent of terrorists to inflict massive
damage. Nuclear proliferation has proceeded apace, with North Korea and Iran
achieving nuclear weapon capability or coming closer to it, and it could spread
further. The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism, and DoD is
beginning to devote significant effort to combating WMD. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has been established. Thinking about the threat of
clandestine nuclear attack has changed, and some efforts to explore defenses
have begun. However, one thing has not changed: little has actually been done
against the threat of clandestine nuclear attack. The DSB Summer Study on
Transnational Threats (1997) first developed the ambitious idea of a very
large, multi-element, global, layered civil/military system of systems of scope
sufficient to have some prospect of effectively thwarting this threat. There
was little resonance with this vision (outside of the Task Forces in 1997 and
2000), but since then, and especially since the attacks of 11 Sept. 2001, it
has begun to be discussed more widely. This report will revisit such a
national/global system, largely as context for the main focus of the Task
Force: DoD’s roles and capabilities. Following briefings from many government
agencies and subject matter experts, the Task Force arrived at its basic
findings and recommendations in early 2003. Since then, those results have been
discussed in over 40 meetings within DoD and elsewhere, leading to certain
refinements. This report reflects the outcomes of that process and weaves
together viewgraphs used in the discussions with elaborating text.

The Threat of
Inadvertent Nuclear War in South Asia [103 Pages]

United States
Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 [182 Pages]

of Social Structures: Studies of Social Dimensions of Nuclear Attack
Pages, 39.1 MB] – Possible patterns of social effects and societal
vulnerabilities which would result from nuclear attack on the United States are
surveyed through analyses of the social sciences. The analyses are centered on
the various ways in which social structure and social institutions may be
considered to be vulnerable to nuclear attack. A monograph is presented on the
general problems of societal analysis posed by attempts to study the
vulnerabilities of social structure to nuclear attack. The central theme is
that levels of behavioral ordering beyond the individual — particularly social
institutional and social organizational processes — set the dimensions for the
social effects of attack. Five essays report on particular domains of social
effects which may result from nuclear attack and on particular methodological
problems which must be solved in the study of social effects. Topics considered
include individual- human and social psychological dimensions of nuclear
attack, demographic effects and population recovery problems, economic recovery
after nuclear war, political-administrative dimensions of nuclear attack, and
the use of especially the comparative method of social analysis as a tool for
developing knowledge about societal vulnerability. A number of ways are traced
in which the social dimensions and domains of nuclear attack indicate problems
for planners and administrators. The fundamental problem of social planning to
reduce societal vulnerability is to understand and control the unfolding of
what can be conceived as characteristic, time-dependent, sequentially ordered
progressions of social attack effects.

Warsaw Pact Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option? 1979
Pages, 3.31MB] – NATO bases its theater doctrine on the assumptions that any
Warsaw Pact attack will be preceeded by considerable warning time and that
initial hostilities will be in a conventional mode. In this paper the author
assesses the viability of the opposing scenario: a Warsaw Pact short-warning
attack with nuclear weapons employed from the start. The author concludes that
Soviet open source documents indicate that NATO is preparing to fight the wrong
first battle of the next war.

Missile Strike Intelligence: An Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment System

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