On September 11, 2012 in Libya, a heavily armed group executed an
attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi. The attack began at night in
a U.S. diplomatic compound for the consulate, and ended at another diplomatic
compound nearby where the U.S. intelligence was posted. Killed were U.S.
Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other members of his diplomatic
mission, U.S. Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith and
U.S. embassy security personnel Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods. Two other
Americans and seven Libyans were also injured. The Benghazi attack was strongly
condemned by the governments of Libya, the United States and other countries
around the world.

Libyans held demonstrations in Benghazi and Tripoli, condemning
the violence and holding signs such as, “Chris Stevens was a friend to all
Libyans”, and apologizing to Americans for the actions in their name and in the
name of Muslims. On September 21, about 30,000 Libyans protested against armed
militias in their country including Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militia
alleged to have played a role in the attack, and stormed several militia
headquarters, forcing the occupants to flee. On September 23, the Libyan
president ordered that all unauthorized militias either disband or come under
government control. Militias across the country began surrendering to the
government and submitting to its authority. Hundreds of Libyans gathered in
Tripoli and Benghazi to hand over their weapons to the government.

The attack followed the mobbing of the U.S. embassy in Cairo,
Egypt, which was in reaction to the anti-Islamic film Innocence of Muslims. On
September 28, U.S. intelligence revised their initial assessment to indicate
that it “was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by
extremists”. Questions about whether the White House should have stated or did
state this conclusion earlier and whether the site of the assault was
adequately secured before and after the attack created political controversy
during the US 2012 Presidential election then underway. The United States
investigation of the attack is being conducted separately by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the State Department, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Source: Wikipedia

Note from The Black Vault: I have filed
FOIA requests to multiple agencies regarding this attack. I am still awaiting
additional records responsive to the attack, but have included the below
records from my archives for research.

Search for Documents on Benghazi

following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi. I still
have MULTIPLE requests still open and being processed, and they will be made
available here when I get them.

Did the U.S. Government receive warnings of a threat on 9/11/12?

Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around
 [ 5 Pages, 1MB ] – The FBI found 72 pages of responsive
records to this search, but each of them were classified and exempt from
release.  Could these pages potentially show the Obama Administration was
negligent and ignored warnings of a terrorist attack on 9/11/12?

Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around
9/11/12, on documents originating with a “Other Government Agency”
3 Pages, 0.2MB ] – The FBI had sent 4 pages to a “Other Government Agency”
that was responsible for the documents. They determined that these, as well,
were entirely classified and exempt from release.

Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around
 [ 2 Pages, 0.2MB ] – The CIA responded on behalf of
the Department of State, when they found multiple pages responsive to my
request.  The CIA says that each document is classified, and exempt from

Related FOIA Documents

Response for Records
[2 Pages, 0.6mb]

 State Department “Rapid Response: Hot Topics” Newsletter for
the month of September 2012
 [ 37 Pages, 1.6MB ] – These
newsletters are issued daily by the State Department, and circulated
internally. I requested the entire month of September 2012 to show the days
leading up to and following the Benghazi attack.

Response to FOIA request for all transcripts from interviews with Benghazi
 [4 Pages, 2.35MB] –

“Talking Point” Timeline revisions
[8 Pages, 1.7mb] – This document,
released by ABC News, shows the different versions of the “talking points”
relating to Benghazi. There is a drastic change over the course of 12

 Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision —
Emails from the White House, released April 2014
Pages, 43.76mb] – These records come from my friends over at Judicial Watch,
who do great work obtaining hard to get documents.  To quote FoxNews on
their release, “Newly released emails on the Benghazi terror attack suggest a
senior White House aide played a central role in preparing former U.N.
ambassador Susan Rice for her controversial Sunday show appearances — where she
wrongly blamed protests over an Internet video.”

Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision
— Emails from the DNI, State Dept. CIA and others
[100 Pages, 36.71mb] – These pages were released to The Black
Vault from the Director of National Intelligence in a request for all emails
pertaining to the “talking points” and how they were revised behind the scenes
before Susan Rice and others used them in the days after the attack.  Very
interesting to see what went into it, and how they knew from the start the
bullet point about it being over a protest would be an issue.  You will
also see where the information about the “warnings” given PRIOR to 9/11/12,
along with the terrorist ties, were completely cut out of the final version.

Attack Scene Photos
[8 Pages, 1.6mb] – Thanks to my friends over at Judicial Watch, photos
from the scene of the Benghazi attack were released under the FOIA after
originally being deemed classified, and exempt from disclosure under FOIA
exemption (b)(7). These are the first photos to have been officially released
from the scene of the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response for Benghazi “threats” towards the consulate, or to
the US on or around 9/11/12
 [3 Pages, 1.02MB] – In a search for
records relating to a threat towards either the United States, or the Benghazi
consulate, I filed a FOIA request to the FBI for records relating to anything
that may indicate we had prior knowledge that an attack was imminent around
9/11/12.  The response? FOIA exemption (b)(7) – law enforcement
information, which if released, would interfere with an ongoing proceeding.

House Releases Emails Regarding Benghazi
[100 Pages, 29.12mb] – On
5/15/2013, The White House released 100 pages of emails regarding the ‘talking
points’ that would be discussed in the days that followed the attack in
Benghazi.  Up until this date, the White House refused to release them to congressional

Mountain Group (BMG) Security Firm Repeatedly Abandoned Their Posts in Benghazi
due to “fear” for their safety
 [ 130 Pages, 39.28MB ] – On September
10th, 2014, Judicial Watch announced that it had obtained 130 pages of new
State Department documents revealing that local security guards working for
Blue Mountain Group (BMG), the firm hired to protect the U.S. Special Mission
in Benghazi, repeatedly abandoned their posts “out of fear of their safety” in
the months leading up to the deadly terrorist attack on the special mission
compound. Source and special thanks: Judicial Watch

Report of the Select Committee on
the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

Published 6/28/2016

Washington, D.C. – Select
Committee on Benghazi
Chairman Trey Gowdy (SC-04)
released the following statement after the committee’s Majority released a mark
of its investigative report:

“Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods were
heroes who gave their lives in service to our country. Their bravery and the
courageous actions of so many others on the ground that night should be

“When the Select Committee was formed, I promised to conduct this
investigation in a manner worthy of the American people’s respect, and worthy
of the memory of those who died. That is exactly what my colleagues and I have

“Now, I simply ask the American people to read this report for
themselves, look at the evidence we have collected, and reach their own
conclusions. You can read this report in less time than our fellow citizens
were taking fire and fighting for their lives on the rooftops and in the
streets of Benghazi.”

The committee’s proposed report is just over 800 pages long and is
comprised of five primary sections and 12 appendices. It details relevant
events in 2011 and 2012.

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part I:

  • Despite President Obama and
    Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s clear orders to deploy military
    assets, nothing was sent to Benghazi, and nothing was en route to Libya at
    the time the last two Americans were killed almost 8 hours after the
    attacks began. [pg. 141]

  • With Ambassador Stevens
    missing, the White House convened a roughly two-hour meeting at 7:30 PM,
    which resulted in action items focused on a YouTube video, and others
    containing the phrases “[i]f any deployment is made,” and “Libya must
    agree to any deployment,” and “[w]ill not deploy until order comes to go
    to either Tripoli or Benghazi.” [pg. 115]

  • The Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff typically would have participated in the White House
    meeting, but did not attend because he went home to host a dinner party
    for foreign dignitaries. [pg. 107]

  • A Fleet Antiterrorism
    Security Team (FAST) sat on a plane in Rota, Spain, for three hours, and
    changed in and out of their uniforms four times. [pg. 154]

  • None of the relevant military forces met
    their required deployment timelines. [pg. 150]

  • The Libyan forces that
    evacuated Americans from the CIA Annex to the Benghazi airport was not
    affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had
    developed a relationship with during the prior 18 months. Instead, it was
    comprised of former Qadhafi loyalists who the U.S. had helped remove from
    power during the Libyan revolution. [pg. 144]

Rep. Mike Pompeo (KS-04)
released the following statement regarding these findings:

“We expect our government to make every effort to save the lives
of Americans who serve in harm’s way. That did not happen in
Benghazi. Politics were put ahead of the lives of Americans, and while the
administration had made excuses and blamed the challenges posed by time and
distance, the truth is that they did not try.”

Rep. Martha Roby (AL-02) released
the following statement regarding these findings:

“Our committee’s insistence on additional information about the
military’s response to the Benghazi attacks was met with strong opposition from
the Defense Department, and now we know why. Instead of attempting to hide
deficiencies in our posture and performance, it’s my hope our report will help
ensure we fix what went wrong so that a tragedy like this never happens

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part II:

  • Five of the 10 action items from the 7:30
    PM White House meeting referenced the video, but no direct link or solid
    evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the
    time the meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the
    meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The
    Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the
    Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple
    updates about the situation, including a “Terrorism Event Notification.”
    The State Department Watch Center had also notified Jake Sullivan and
    Cheryl Mills that it had set up a direct telephone line to Tripoli. There
    was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Greg Hicks—one
    of the last people to talk to Chris Stevens before he died—said there was
    virtually no discussion about the video in Libya leading up to the
    attacks. [pg. 28]

  • The morning after the
    attacks, the National Security Council’s Deputy Spokesperson sent an email
    to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, State
    Department, and intelligence community, stating: “Both the President and
    Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. … Please refer to
    those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we are all in sync on
    messaging for the rest of the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call
    for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today.” [pg. 39]

  • Minutes before the President
    delivered his speech in the Rose Garden, Jake Sullivan wrote in an email
    to Ben Rhodes and others: “There was not really much violence in Egypt.
    And we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over
    inflammatory videos.’” [pg. 44]

  • According to Susan Rice, both
    Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe prepared her for her appearances on the
    Sunday morning talk shows following the attacks. Nobody from the FBI,
    Department of Defense, or CIA participated in her prep call. While Rhodes
    testified Plouffe would “normally” appear on the Sunday show prep calls,
    Rice testified she did not recall Plouffe being on prior calls and did not
    understand why he was on the call in this instance. [pg.98]

  • On the Sunday shows, Susan
    Rice stated the FBI had “already begun looking at all sorts of evidence”
    and “FBI has a lead in this investigation.” But on Monday, the Deputy
    Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs sent an email stating: “McDonough
    apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video Teleconference] group today that
    everyone was required to ‘shut their pieholes’ about the Benghazi attack
    in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.” [pg. 135]

  • After Susan Rice’s Sunday
    show appearances, Jake Sullivan assured the Secretary of the State that
    Rice “wasn’t asked about whether we had any intel. But she did make clear
    our view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.” [pg. 128]

  • Susan Rice’s comments on the
    Sunday talk shows were met with shock and disbelief by State Department
    employees in Washington. The Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near
    Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: “I think Rice was off the
    reservation on this one.” The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public
    Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded:
    “Off the reservation on five networks!” The Senior Advisor for Strategic
    Communications, Bureau of Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: “WH
    [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.”
    [pg. 132]

  • The CIA’s September 13, 2012,
    intelligence assessment was rife with errors. On the first page, there is
    a single mention of “the early stages of the protest” buried in one of the
    bullet points. The article cited to support the mention of a protest in
    this instance was actually from September 4. In other words, the analysts
    used an article from a full week before the attacks to support the premise
    that a protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11. [pg.

  • A headline on the following
    page of the CIA’s September 13 intelligence assessment stated “Extremists
    Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,” but nothing in the actual text box
    supports that title. As it turns out, the title of the text box was
    supposed to be “Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.” That small but
    vital difference—from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how
    people in the administration were able to message the attacks. [pg. 52]

Rep. Jim Jordan (OH-04)
released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Obama Administration officials, including the Secretary of State,
learned almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack.
Rather than tell the American people the truth, the administration told one
story privately and a different story publicly.”

Rep. Peter Roskam (IL-06)
released the following statement regarding these findings:

“In the days and weeks after the attacks, the White House worked
to pin all of the blame for their misleading and incorrect statements on
officials within the intelligence community, but in reality, political
operatives like Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe were spinning the false narrative
and prepping Susan Rice for her interviews.”

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part

  • During deliberations within
    the State Department about whether and how to intervene in Libya in March
    2011, Jake Sullivan listed the first goal as “avoid[ing] a failed state,
    particularly one in which al-Qaeda and other extremists might take safe
    haven.” [pg. 9]

  • The administration’s policy
    of no boots on the ground shaped the type of military assistance provided
    to State Department personnel in Libya. The Executive Secretariats for
    both the Defense Department and State Department exchanged communications
    outlining the diplomatic capacity in which the Defense Department SST
    security team members would serve, which included wearing civilian clothes
    so as not to offend the Libyans. [pg. 60]

  • When the State Department’s
    presence in Benghazi was extended in December 2012, senior officials from
    the Bureau of Diplomatic Security were excluded from the discussion. [pg.

  • In February 2012, the lead
    Diplomatic Security Agent at Embassy Tripoli informed his counterpart in
    Benghazi that more DS agents would not be provided by decision makers,
    because “substantive reporting” was not Benghazi’s purpose. [pg. 77]

  • Emails indicate senior State
    Department officials, including Cheryl Mills, Jake Sullivan, and Huma
    Abedin were preparing for a trip by the Secretary of State to Libya in
    October 2012. According to testimony, Chris Stevens wanted to have a
    “deliverable” for the Secretary for her trip to Libya, and that
    “deliverable” would be making the Mission in Benghazi a permanent
    Consulate. [pg. 96]

  • In August 2012—roughly a
    month before the Benghazi attacks—security on the ground worsened
    significantly. Ambassador Stevens initially planned to travel to Benghazi
    in early August, but cancelled the trip “primarily for Ramadan/security
    reasons.” [pg. 99]

  • Former Secretary of Defense
    Leon Panetta bluntly told the committee “an intelligence failure” occurred
    with respect to Benghazi. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell also
    acknowledged multiple times an intelligence failure did in fact occur
    prior to the Benghazi attacks. [pg. 129]

Rep. Susan Brooks (IN-05)
released the following statement regarding these findings:

“President Obama has said his worst mistake was ‘failing to plan
for the day after … intervening in Libya.’ As a result of this ‘lead from
behind’ foreign policy, the Libyan people were forced to make the dismal trade
of the tyranny of Qadhafi for the terror of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others. Although
the State Department considered Libya a grave risk to American diplomats in
2011 and 2012, our people remained in a largely unprotected, unofficial
facility that one diplomatic security agent the committee interviewed characterized
as ‘a suicide mission.’”

Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (GA-03)
released the following statement regarding these findings:

“One of the most concerning parts of the State Department’s policy
in Libya was its reliance upon the militias of an unstable nation to protect
our men and women in Benghazi. These were by no means forces that could
adequately protect Americans on the ground, and the State Department knew it.
But the appearance of no boots on the ground was more important to the

Part IV of the report reveals new information about the Select
Committee’s requests and subpoenas seeking documents and witnesses regarding
Benghazi and Libya, and details what the Obama administration provided to
Congress, what it is still withholding, and how its serial delays hindered the
committee’s efforts to uncover the truth.

Part V proposes 25 recommendations for the Pentagon, State
Department, Intelligence Community, and Congress aimed at strengthening
security for American personnel serving abroad and doing everything possible to
ensure something like Benghazi never happens again, and if it does, that we are
better prepared to respond.

The Select Committee intends to convene a bipartisan markup to
discuss and vote on the proposed report on July 8, 2016. All members of the
committee will have the opportunity to offer changes in a manner consistent
with the rules of the House.

the Report
 [853 Pages, 10.7MB]

Honoring Courage, Improving
Security and Fighting the Exploitation of a Tragedy

June 2016

the report states, “The Democratic Members of the Benghazi Select Committee submit
this report in honor of the memories of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean
Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; the other extraordinary heroes in
Benghazi and Tripoli who risked life and limb to help their fellow Americans;
and the men and women of the Defense Department, State Department, and
Intelligence Community who serve the United States every day around the world.”

can’t our elected officials work together? Why can’t they do an unbiased
investigation into ANY event, including Benghazi?  Regardless of the
answers, this report is included here for reference and fairness.

the Report
 [344 Pages, 4.3MB]

U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence


House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI” or “the Committee”)
conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation into the tragic attacks
against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012. The
nearly two-year investigation focused on the activities of the Intelligence
Community (“IC”) before, during, and after the attacks. During the course of
thousands of hours of detailed investigation, HPSCI reviewed thousands of pages
of intelligence assessments, cables, notes, and emails; held 20 Committee
events and hearings; and conducted detailed interviews with senior intelligence
officials and eyewitnesses to the attacks, including eight security personnel
on the ground in Benghazi that night.

the Report
 [37 Pages, 2.5MB]

Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations Releases Report on DOD Response to Benghazi


– The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
released a comprehensive report today evaluating the response of the Department
of Defense (DOD) to the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on September 11,
2012. Read the Report

undertake the committee’s review, Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon directed the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to work alongside the full
committee. As a result, this report expresses the views of Chairman McKeon,
Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry, Rep. Martha Roby (who was the chairman of the
Oversight and Investigations subcommittee until December 2013), and the five
majority members of that subcommittee.

date, committee staff has reviewed thousands of pages of written material
(including classified emails and situation reports) made available by DOD.
Staff has also held three classified staff briefings, and two classified interviews.
Members have participated in two open hearings, and seven additional classified
briefings. In undertaking this work, the committee has met with and received
information from military personnel in the entire chain of command in
connection with Benghazi: from those on the ground at the time of the attack to
the nation’s senior-most uniformed leader.

the committee’s inquiry continues, the majority members believe that
information gathered to date reaffirm the relevant findings in the Interim
Progress Report for the Members of the Republican Conference on the Events
Surrounding the September 11, 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Libya issued
in April 2013 by the five committees with jurisdiction in the U.S. House of

on its activities undertaken since the release of that report, majority members
make the six findings listed below:

the Report
[31 Pages, 0.4MB]

about the Benghazi Aftermath

following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi, and the
aftermath in the days, weeks and months after the attack.

  • Correspondence
    Between Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Members of
    Congress, 09/01/2012 – 12/31/2012
    , Released March 2015 [47 Pages,
  • Director
    of National Intelligence E-Mails Regarding Benghazi
    , Released December
    of 2015 [26 Pages, 3.5MB] – After being told there were no documents
    relating to my request for correspondence to or from the consulate in
    Benghazi. After appealing their decision, I was asked to withdraw it, and
    they would do another search for responsive records. As a result, there
    were responsive records, and they were redacted and released. This is
    another example of being told one thing, but after pushing and excersizing
    my appeal rights, there is another picture that unfolds.
  • A
    Trainee Demand Analysis for the Expansion of the Marine Corps Embassy
    Security Group, March 2013, Master’s Thesis
    [95 Pages, 4.54mb]
    – On September 11, 2012, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was
    attacked, resulting in the death of four United States citizens, including
    Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Prior to Bengazi, the Marine Corps Embassy
    Security Group (MCESG) held a total strength of about 1,400 Marines, of
    which 1,196 were Marine Security Guards (MSG). In response to the deadly
    attack, Congress authorized 1,000 new MSGs through the 2013 National Defense
    Authorization Act, creating additional protection for U.S. diplomatic
    facilities worldwide. This thesis examines the growth requirements needed
    to support MCESG’s expansion demands to produce MSGs at maximum capacity
    in the coming three to four years. The study analyzes trainee demands,
    proposing a methodology to assist MCESG operation personnel plans for
    expansion and future force sustainment. The proposed methodology is
    founded on an Excel-based analytical approach that relies heavily on
    simulation and is interfaced through a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)
    UserForm. The model is easily manipulated, as operational needs dictate.
    Once developed, VBA UserForm is a simple and effective tool that can
    assist planners in standardizing procedures at the operational level.
    Research-based analysis indicates that the proposed methodology could
    yield significant savings in terms of manpower and training requirements
    for MCESG.
  • CTC
    Sentinel – Volume 6, Issue 2, February 2013
    [25 Pages, 1.51MB]
    – Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya.

Declassified Transcripts of
Benghazi Briefings Released

13th, 2014 – The House Armed Services Committee today released a series of
recently declassified transcripts of briefings on the September 11th 2012
attack on Americans in Benghazi, Libya. The briefings were conducted by the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations then chaired by Rep. Martha Roby
(R-AL), though they were open to all members of the Committee and attended by
Members off the Committee. The briefings, which took place over the course of
several months, were part of the Committee’s examination of the actions of the
military chain of command before, during, and after the attack. A report
summarizing the conclusion of the HASC Oversight & Investigations majority
Members draw from these briefings is expected to be released later this week.


transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,”
(Part I, Session I, DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf
 (3.7 MBs)


transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in
Benghazi,” (Part I, Session II DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf
 (642.4 KBs)


transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in
Benghazi,” (Part II, AFRICOM), June 26, 2013.pdf
 (9.2 MBs)


transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in
Benghazi,” (Part III, Colonel Bristol), July 31, 2013.pdf
 (10.8 MBs)


transcript, “DOD’s posture for September 11, 2013,” (Part IV, Force Posture),
September 19, 2013.pdf
 (691.9 KBs)


transcript (redacted), “DOD’s force posture in anticipation of September 11,
2012,” (Part V, General Dempsey), October 10, 2013.pdf
 (2.3 MBs)

Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation

year, Speaker John Boehner asked the House committees on Armed Services,
Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, and Oversight & Government Reform
to investigate the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya that killed four
Americans. On 4/23/13, these five committees released their progress report,
which outlines their findings and the next steps in the investigation.

of Documents and Events Relating to the Benghazi Attack

1.     8/27/12
– Travel Warning, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Bureau of Consular Affairs, in
regards to Libya
[2 Pages, 113kb] – Specifically mentions Benghazi with
increased violence.

2.     9/11/12
– Statement on the Attack in Benghazi, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State,
Department of State
[1 Page, 90kb] – Blames internet video for attack. No mention of
“terror” or “terrorism”

3.     9/12/12
– Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi
[1 Page, 96kb] –
Written Statement released by the President. No mention of video. No mention of
“terror” or “terrorism”

4.     9/12/12
– Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi, Rose Garden Speech

[Video] – No mention of “terror” or “terrorism” in relation to Benghazi. Says
“No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve on this great nation…” at the
end of the speech, however, he was speaking about the 9/11/01 attacks, and his
visits to victims and family members.

5.     9/12/12
– Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary
Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State
[3 Pages, 90kb] – The
video of this speech, is below in the Video Archive. Blames
internet video for attack.
No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

6.     9/12/12
– Press Statement on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya,
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State
[2 Pages, 101kb]-

internet video for attack.
No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

7.     9/12/12
– Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Susan Rice,
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations , U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, Department of State
[3 Pages, 98kb] –Blames
internet video for attack.
No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

8.     9/12/12
– Briefing by Senior Administration Officials to Update Recent Events in Libya

[3 Pages, 98kb] – Will
not answer if internet video was cause of attack. Will not answer if
there is a “terrorism” link.

9.     9/13/12
– State Department Daily Press Briefing
[21 Pages, 180kb] – Confirms
blaming internet video for attack.
No mention of “terror” or

– S
on the Deaths of Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty in Benghazi, Libya,
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State
[2 Pages, 101kb]-
No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney
[17 Pages, 166kb] Blames
internet video as attack. Denies any “concrete evidence” of a “terror” link
that would show “[the attack] to not being in response to the film.”

– Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in
Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State
[3 Pages, 99kb] Blames
internet video as attack.
No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in
Benghazi, Libya, President Barack Obama
[2 Pages, 125kb]- No mention of
video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Background Briefing on Libya
[13 Pages, 140kb]-

Said video
was not their conclusion for attack..
No mention of “terror” or

– On-The-Record Briefing by Under Secretary Kennedy
[4 Pages, 110kb] – WATCH
– No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight
Subcommittee, Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management
[4 Pages,
108kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight
Subcommittee, Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant, Secretary of State
[8 Pages,
124kb] – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Prepared Statement Before the House
Oversight Subcommittee, Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer,
Tripoli, Libya from September 21, 2011-July 26, 2012
[12 Pages, 191kb]-

No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

– Interview With Margaret Brennan of CBS, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of
[4 Pages, 108kb] -No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or

– Daily Press Briefing, Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson
[19 Pages, 190kb]- No
mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

Flashing Red: A Special Report on
the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi (Official Senate Report)

1.     Flashing
Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi
[31 Pages, 0.4mb]
– While our country spent September 11, 2012, remembering the terrorist attacks
that took place 11 years earlier, brave Americans posted at U.S. government
facilities in Benghazi, Libya, were fighting for their lives against a
terrorist assault. When the fight ended, U.S. Ambassador to Libya John C.
(Chris) Stevens and three other Americans were dead and U.S. facilities in
Benghazi were left in ruin. We must remember the sacrifice that these selfless
public servants made to support the struggle for freedom in Libya and to
improve our own national security. While we mourn their deaths, it is also
crucial that we learn from how they died. By examining the circumstances of the
attack in Benghazi on September 11th, we hope to gain a better understanding of
what went wrong and what we must do now to ensure better protection for
American diplomatic personnel who must sometimes operate in dangerous places

government records, detailing the highly volatile situation in Libya and

Strikes Back, April 1987
 [44 Pages, 16.53mb] – After repeated warnings
from the United States government, elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the
USAF bombed targets in and around the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli on
14 April 1986. The attack came in retaliation to several Libyan sponsored
terrorist attacks on U.S. concerns in the weeks preceding. This paper examines
the effects of the bombing as a deterrent of future terrorist attacks and
further examines current and projected U.S. counterterrorist policies.

with Libya: Use of Military Force Against Terrorism, 8 Feb 1994
[30 Pages,
1.1mb] – The United States attack on Libya on April 15, 1986 was the
culmination of a series of developments in U.S. foreign policy and military
strategy intended to combat international terrorism. It was the culmination of
the U.S. attempt to use both non- military and military methods to combat
terrorism. This paper examines the use of military force as an appropriate
means to combat terrorism. In particular, the 1986 conflict with Libya is
examined concentrating on the following aspects: whether operational level
objectives contributed to achievement of strategic goals; and the use of
military force as an effective instrument in the war against terrorism. This
paper concludes that the use of military force (along with the European non-
military responses) was an effective instrument in the war against terrorism as
measured by the decrease in Libyan sponsored attacks from 1986 to 1991.
However, the U.S. attack on Libya is still an isolated event and does not
provide a sufficient basis for a doctrine of military retaliation against

Libya: The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qaddafi, October 2000
[31 Pages,
0.2mb] – In September of 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi then a virtually unknown army
officer in his late twenties rose to the leadership of Libya. Armed with a
vision of Arab unity and anti-colonialism, he led a small group of his fellow
officers who called themselves the Free Officers Movement. In a virtually
bloodless coup, they ousted the aging (and absent) King Idris Al-Sanusi and
established Libya as a republic. During the 30 years since, Qaddafi has emerged
as a charismatic and complicated leader. Considered by Westerners to be bizarre
and irrational, he has been branded a terrorist and a rogue. Among some of his
fellow Arabs, he is praised as a virulent anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist,
while others condemn him as a plotter and an adventurer whose zealous pursuit
of Arab, African, and Islamic unity has only resulted in destabilization.
Qaddafi remarked in 1976 that atomic weapons will be like traditional ones,
possessed by every state according to its potential. We will have our share of
this new weapon. In 1987 Reuters quoted him as saying: The Arabs must possess
the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach one thousand
million and they learn to desalinate water and until they liberate Palestine. 1
Qaddafi places little faith in his armed forces and dreads a repeat of the 1986
U.S. air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi. Reflecting on the air strikes,
Qaddafi has wistfully spoken of possessing a ballistic missile capability that
could threaten New York.2 Few state leaders have expressed such single-minded
determination to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This determination,
coupled with Qaddafi s long-term association with terrorism, has caused grave
concern among other nations especially the United States and Israel.

A Future Arab Democracy
[43 Pages, 0.6mb] – Libya has overthrown its long
time dictator Muammar Gadhafi with the aid of both Western and Arab militaries.
The United States acted under the authority of U.N. mandate 1973 as part of a
broad coalition of both NATO and Arab Nations primarily in a supporting role.
In Libya, as in its neighbors Egypt and Tunisia, the successful revolution has
now established transitional governments who’s effectiveness is yet to be
determined. Unlike other Arab nations, Libya possesses a combination of vast
oil reserves, a small and balanced population, and a relatively high education
level in its citizens. These factors all bode well for the establishment of a
lasting representative government. If successful, Libya can not only secure its
borders, and deny safe haven to terrorism as is the declared interest of the
United States, but also serve as a positive economic and political influence on
the region. Egypt remains the most significant and strategic nation in the
region, but the benefits of a successful Libya and the relatively low cost at
which it may be achieved should not be overlooked.

Unrest and US Policy
[43 Pages, 0.7mb] – Over 40 years ago, Muammar al
Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism,
self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same
principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the
authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four
decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition
forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the
United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all
necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. The United States military is
participating in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, and other partner governments also are participating.
Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and
Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi
remains defiant amid continuing coalition air strikes, and his forces continue
to attack opposition-held areas. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim
Transitional National Council (ITNC), which claims to represent all areas of
the country. They seek foreign political recognition and material support.

Nation at the Periphery: Libyan Regionalism Revisited
[43 Pages, 0.6mb] –
This article places the current Libyan conflict in historical perspective by
focusing on the dynamics between the country’s two main regions (Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica) during key moments of the 20th century. Particular attention is
given to the different way each of the two regions approached the early period
of Italian colonialism, from 1911 to 1923. The paper shows that historical
relations between the two regions are characterized by both independence and
interdependence and that this pattern is reemerging as the country transitions
to a new era.

Recovery: Strategic Importance and Impact, December 2012
[31 Pages, 0.6mb]
– The breaking news from countless media venues in March 2011 was captivating
and compelling: while taking part in coalition operations in Libya, a US Air
Force F-15E, call sign Bolar 34 had gone down east of Benghazi. The two crew
members had ejected into a chaotic battle between the despotic Libyan regime
and opposition forces supported by the coalition. As our nation prayed for the
two Airmen, President Barack Obama heard a briefing on the event and monitored
the situation as rescue forces from a US Marine task force in the area and
opposition ground forces quickly dashed in to recover both men. In many ways,
this heartwarming story resembled accounts of other rescues performed in
earlier conflicts. The saga of Bolar 34 joined the lore of rescue missions that
grace the proud history of our nation.