Naftali, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia

Norman J.W. Goda, Ohio University

Richard Breitman, American University

Robert Wolfe, National Archives (ret.)


The CIA file on Heinrich Mueller, chief of Hitler’s Gestapo and a major
Nazi war criminal, sheds important new light on U.S. and international efforts
to find Mueller after his disappearance in May 1945. Though inconclusive on
Mueller’s ultimate fate, the file is very clear on one point. The Central
Intelligence Agency and its predecessors did not know Mueller’s whereabouts at
any point after the war. In other words, the CIA was never in contact with
Gestapo Mueller. To assist other scholars, the press, and the general public in
making sense of this new information about the CIA’s investigation of this
controversial war criminal, the authors have drawn on other documents at the
National Archives for this report.

Mueller and the Nazi Regime

Mueller was born in Munich on April 28, 1900. After serving as a pilot in
World War I, he joined the police in Munich, soon acquiring a reputation as a
skilled anti-communist investigator who did not feel bound by legal norms of
police investigation. As such, he would draw the attention of Heinrich Himmler
and Reinhard Heydrich, leaders of Hitler’s SS. Following Hitler’s rise to power
in 1933, Himmler and Heydrich consolidated German regional police units while
creating a national political police, the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo).
Mueller entered the SS in 1934 and quickly rose through the ranks of that
organization as a police official. In September 1939, when the Gestapo and
other police organizations were consolidated into the Reich Main Security
Office (RSHA), Mueller was made the Chief of RSHA Amt IV — the Gestapo.

As Gestapo chief, Mueller oversaw the implementation of Hitler’s policies
against Jews and other groups deemed a threat to the state. The notorious Adolf
Eichmann, who headed the Gestapo’s Office of Resettlement and then its Office
of Jewish Affairs, was Mueller’s immediate subordinate. Once World War II
began, Mueller and Eichmann planned key components in the deportation and then
extermination of Europe’s Jews.

Mueller was involved in other criminal affairs as well. He helped plan the
phony Polish attack on Gleiwitz radio station in 1939 (used to justify
Germany’s attack on Poland). He signed the “Bullet Order” of March
1944 (authorizing the shooting of escaped prisoners of war) and authorized the
torture of officers who had conspired to kill Hitler in July 1944. Mueller’s
zeal in countering the 20 July plot earned him the rare military decoration of
the Knight’s Cross to the War Service Cross with Swords in October 1944.

Mueller also managed security and counterespionage operations. His most
spectacular counterespionage success was the development of a double-cross
network that fed disinformation to the Soviet intelligence services between
1942 and 1945. Located in Berlin and a few other Western European capitals,
this network had been extremely successful in sending sensitive political and
military information to Moscow. Mueller’s Gestapo team was able to capture a
number of these agents and “turn” them. Codenamed Rote Kapelle (Red
Orchestra), this Gestapo operation was among the greatest Soviet intelligence
setbacks of the war.

Mueller and the End of the War

In the war’s final year, it seems that Heinrich Mueller stubbornly believed
in a Nazi victory. He told one of his top counterespionage case officers in
December 1944 that the Ardennes offensive (known in the U.S. as the Battle of
the Bulge) would result in the recapture of Paris.1 Mueller also
reportedly redoubled efforts to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the
Western allies by using his double agents.

Not everyone was convinced of his sincerity. There were rumors among German
intelligence officers that Mueller had himself been turned by the Soviets.
Walter Schellenberg, chief of the RSHA’s Foreign Intelligence Branch (Amt VI)
and a bitter rival of Mueller, was the source of some of this speculation. When
interrogated by OSS in 1945, Schellenberg claimed that Mueller had been in
friendly radio contact with the Soviets, and Schellenberg’s postwar memoirs
contain verbatim exhortations from 1943 by Mueller on Stalin’s superiority to
Hitler as a leader.2 SS-men close to Mueller considered such rumors
unfounded and illogical. Mueller’s immediate superior Ernst Kaltenbrunner
(Chief of the RSHA), later insisted under Allied interrogation that Mueller
could never have embraced the Soviets. Similarly, Heinz Pannwitz, Mueller’s
Gestapo subordinate who ran Rote Kapelle, categorized the notion that Mueller
had turned as “absolutely absurd” in a 1959 CIA interrogation.3

The First Search for Gestapo

Months before the fall of Berlin, Anglo-American counterespionage officers
began their postwar planning. Under the combined leadership of British MI 5 and
MI 6 and the X-2 (counterespionage) branch of the American Office of Strategic
Services, the SHAEF G-2 Counter Intelligence (CI) War Room began operating in
February 1945. Using Allied lists of Nazi intelligence officers, the War Room
supervised the hunt for the remnants of Germany’s military and police
intelligence services. Initially, the chief concern of the officers of the CI War
Room was that Nazi intelligence units would survive the war and, financed with
looted assets, launch paramilitary operations in the Bavarian Alps.
Intelligence reaching the War Room in the last months of the war did not
mention Mueller as a possible leader of postwar Nazi operations, but given his
command of the Gestapo, Mueller remained an important man to capture.

On May 27, 1945 the Counter Intelligence War Room issued a statement about
its priority targets for interrogations in what it called the German
intelligence service. At the top of the list were Nazi intelligence officials
involved in foreign intelligence (RSHA Amt VI). Next in priority were security
police and SD units in occupied countries. Gestapo officials came farther down
the target list. A War Room instruction to interrogators of captured RSHA
officers listed the top missing persons: interrogators were to ask: “Where
(All but Mueller were subsequently located and interrogated.) A War Room
fortnightly report covering the period ending June 18, 1945 stated that no
leading officials of the Gestapo had yet been arrested, and “it seems
clear from most reports that Mueller remained in Berlin after the
collapse.”5 His fate was contrasted with that of other Gestapo
personalities who fled south. A separate OSS X-2 (counterintelligence) report
at the end of the month repeated that no highranking Gestapo officials had yet
been captured and that Mueller had remained in Berlin.6

A War Room monthly summary in late July 1945 reported that Amt VI officials
had largely surrendered, while most Amt IV (Gestapo) officials remained at
large. Mueller’s fate was still unknown: “Some of our evidence, though it
is by no means conclusive, suggests that Mueller himself may have remained in
Berlin until the last [while]… the greater part of Amt IV collected itself at
Hof, near Munich, and at Salzburg and Innsbruck.7 A War Room
intelligence arrest target list, dated August 21, commented about ‘H. Mueller,
head of the Gestapo’: “Last reported Berlin, Apr. 1945.”8
A later revision to the arrest target list reported the arrest of several
Gestapo officials, including Walter Huppenkothen who was part of the Red
Orchestra team. But not Heinrich Mueller.9

Ultimately the Allies would find many Heinrich Muellers in occupied Germany
and Austria, but not the right one. Heinrich Mueller is a very common German
name. By the end of 1945, American and British occupation forces had gathered
information on numerous Heinrich Muellers, all of whom had different birth
dates, physical characteristics and job histories. Documentation on some of
them is included-one might say mistakenly jumbled together-in the
“Gestapo” Mueller Army IRR file, which the National Archives released
in 2000. Part of the problem for U.S. record-keepers stemmed from the fact that
some of these Muellers, including Gestapo Mueller, did not appear to have
middle names. An additional source of confusion was that there were two
different SS-Generals named Heinrich Mueller. In at least one instance, an
index card purporting to collate information on Gestapo Mueller, which was
prepared by an American official after the war, actually contains two different
birth dates, as well as data about a third man of the same name. A Heinrich
Mueller was held briefly at the Altenstadt civilian internment camp in 1945.10
Another killed himself along with his wife and his children in April 1946.11

Throughout this period the Counter Intelligence War Room functioned as the
ULTRA/top secret collecting point for information about the locations of the
Allies’ top intelligence targets. Although the occupation forces had
encountered quite a few men named Heinrich Mueller, the War Room’s verdict was
unambiguous: Gestapo Muller had not been found.

In the initial period after the Nazi surrender U.S. counterintelligence
attempted to track down all leads to Mueller. Information reached U.S. army
intelligence that Gestapo Mueller had taken the assumed name Schwartz or
Schwatzer and had gone south from Berlin with another Gestapo official
Christian A. Scholz. But no traces of either man were ever found.12 In
1947, British and American authorities twice searched the home of Gestapo
Mueller’s mistress Anna Schmid for clues, but found nothing suggesting that
Mueller was still alive. With the onset of the Cold War and the shift of
resources to the Soviet target, the assumption took hold in U.S. intelligence
that Gestapo Mueller was dead.13

The West German Investigation

The dramatic Israeli abduction of Mueller’s subordinate Adolf Eichmann from
Argentina in May 1960 created new interest in Nazi war criminals and particularly
in Mueller. Imaginative theories that Mueller (along with Eichmann) had escaped
Berlin and were still alive had been in the press for some time, as well as in
the best selling memoir by Wilhelm Hoettl, himself a former SS officer.14
Eichmann himself helped to fan speculation about in Mueller, when during his
Jerusalem trial, he voiced his belief that Mueller survived the war. Already in
July 1960, the West German office in charge of the prosecution of war criminals
[Zentralle Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen] charged local police
authorities in Bavaria (Mueller’s family still lived in Munich) and Berlin to
investigate. The West Germans were skeptical that Mueller was working for the
Soviets, but did think it possible that Mueller was corresponding from
somewhere with his family or possibly with his former secretary Barbara
Hellmuth. All of these West German citizens were closely watched, and in May
1961 the Bavarian police asked the U.S. occupation forces to put Mueller’s
relatives and Hellmuth under surveillance. West German police also searched the
Berlin home of Anna Schmid, Mueller’s former mistress, and spoke with her.
Schmid told the West German investigators that she had not seen Mueller since
24 April 1945, when he gave her a vial of poison and then disappeared. Her own
efforts to find him in the subsequent days and weeks had been fruitless.15

According to various witnesses interviewed by the West German police in
1961, the last time Mueller was seen alive was the evening of May 1, 1945, the
day after Hitler’s suicide. Several eyewitnesses placed Mueller at Hitler’s
Chancellery building that evening while recounting his refusal to leave with
the breakout group that night. Hans Baur, Hitler’s pilot and an old friend of
Mueller’s, recounts Mueller as saying, “We know the Russian methods
exactly. I haven’t the faintest intention of … being taken prisoner by the
Russians.” Another claimed that Mueller refused to leave with the rest of
Hitler’s entourage, and was overheard saying “the regime has fallen and…I
fall also.” He was last seen in the company of his radio specialist
Christian A. Scholz. And while the bodies of others that remained that night
were recovered and identified, no one in the final group witnessed the death of
Mueller or Scholz.16

West German authorities pursued three major leads in an effort to confirm
Mueller’s death and burial in Berlin in 1945. First, there was the testimony of
Fritz Leopold, a Berlin morgue official who had reported in December 1945 that
Mueller’s body was moved (along with many others) from the RSHA headquarters at
Prinz Albrecht Strasse (2000 feet from the Chancellery) for reburial in a local
municipal cemetery on Lilienthalstrasse (Berlin-Neukoelln) in the Western half
of the city. Leopold was later deemed an unreliable source, but the burial was
officially registered with the Berlin authorities and a headstone would be
placed at Mueller’s “grave” which read, “Our loving father
Heinrich Mueller – Born 28 April 1900 – Died in Berlin May 1945.” A second
story came from Mueller’s ex-subordinate Heinz Pannwitz, who had been captured
by the Soviets and returned to West Germany in 1957, whereupon he told the
German Secret Service [Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND] that his Soviet
interrogators revealed to him that “your Chief [Mueller] is dead.”
The body, they said, had been found in a subway shaft a few blocks from the
Chancellery with a bullet through the head and with its identity documents

The final story came from Walter Lueders, a former member of the German
Volkssturm (civilian fighters) who maintained that he had headed a burial
detail in the summer of 1945. Of the hundreds of bodies buried by the detail,
only one, said Lueders, wore an SS-General’s uniform, and it was found in the
garden of the Reich Chancellery with a large wound in the back. Though the body
had no medals or decorations, Lueders recalled with certainty that the identity
papers were those of Gestapo Mueller. It was moved to the old Jewish Cemetery
on Grosse Hamburgerstasse in the Soviet Sector, where it was placed in one of
three mass graves. In fact, in 1955 the German Armed Forces Information Office
(Wehrmachtsauskunftsstelle – WASt) inquired with district authorities in East
Berlin and received confirmation that Gestapo Mueller was buried at the
Grosse-Hamburgerstrasse cemetery in 1945. Since the grave was a mass grave,
however, there was no actual plot.

The Fritz Leopold story was checked first, and in September 1963, the
Mueller “grave” at the Lilienthalstrasse cemetery in West Berlin was
exhumed. Investigation revealed that in fact, the grave contained the remains
of three different people, none of whom were Mueller. The skull, moreover,
belonged to a man ten years younger than Mueller would have been in 1945. The
German authorities had no means by which to verify either Pannwitz’s or
Lueders’ story. Pannwitz’s information had come from Moscow, and there was no
official liaison between Soviet intelligence and the West Germans on the
Mueller case. Lueders’s story could not be checked since Grosse
Hamburgerstrasse was on the other side of the two-year old Berlin Wall. Adding
to the confusion was the mystery of Mueller’s effects. WASt, according to its
own records, returned to Mueller’s family in 1958 not only the Gestapo Chief’s
papers, some of which Lueders claimed to have found on the body, but also
Mueller’s decorations, which neither Leopold not Lueders claimed to have found.
These items were never checked for authenticity.18

The CIA investigation

The CIA started its involvement in the hunt for Mueller at roughly the same
time as the German search, albeit from a different source base. The January
1961 defection and interrogation of a Polish intelligence officer brought
Western counterintelligence tips that led to several Soviet and Polish agents
active in the West, including George Blake, a mole in the British MI6, Harry
Houghton, a clerk in the British navy, and Heinz Felfe, a highlevel West German
intelligence officer. The defector surely was Lt. Col. Michal Goleniewski [TN],
the Deputy Chief of Polish Military Counter Intelligence until 1958, who had
also operated as a mole for the KGB in the Polish service. In recounting his
work as an interrogator of captured German officials in Poland from 1948 to
1952, Goleniewski revealed information about the fate of some Nazi intelligence
officials, including Gestapo Mueller. Goleniewski had not actually met Mueller.
However, he had heard from his Soviet supervisors that sometime between 1950
and 1952 the Soviets had picked up Mueller and taken him to Moscow.19
There was little with which to evaluate this claim, and some reason to be
skeptical of this hearsay. Pannwitz, after all, had recently dismissed as
“nonsense” to CIA interrogators the idea that Mueller worked for the
Soviets while claiming that his own Soviet interrogators repeatedly said that
Mueller was dead.20

The CIA tried to track down the men Goleniewski named as having worked with
Mueller in Moscow. The CIA determined that Jakob Loellgen, the former Gestapo
chief of Danzig, was alive and resided in West Germany. In 1945 the Soviets had
captured Loellgen but then released him, whereupon he returned to West Germany,
working as a local police chief and as a private investigator. The CIA turned
this information over to the Germans and the BND located Loellgen in 1961.

The Germans dropped the ball. Although the BDN apparently began assembling
material for his arrest, Loellgen was never arrested. The CIA never quite
figured out what had happened. The BND seemed to be preoccupied throughout 1961
with another of Goleniewski’s leads, Heinz Felfe. Felfe was a highlevel BND
officer, who had already provided thousands of West German secrets including
names of agents, cover names, addresses, and documents, to Moscow. In the midst
of the Felfe scandal, West German investigation of Loellgen just fell between
the cracks.21

The CIA did collect some information on its own that bore on the
“Mueller in Moscow” thesis. In June 1961, another source was asked to
assess Goleniewski’s information on Soviet contacts with former Nazis. The
source, who appears to have been a KGB officer, reported having read a
“Mueller file,” in which Mueller is described as having been captured
by Soviet intelligence at the end of World War II. The identity of this source
is not given in the CIA file, but is likely Petr Deriabin [TN]. (Deriabin had
worked on counterintelligence matters in the Austro-German department of the
First Chief Directorate of the KGB.) The defector wrote in a 1971 memorandum
for the record that in 1952 he had heard from his own superiors that Moscow had
recruited Mueller and that he himself had read excerpts from an interrogation.
He even included the names of four Soviet officers who had once debriefed
Mueller in 1951.22

Despite the partial corroboration of the information from Goleniewski, the
CIA appears to have relied on the West Germans to take the lead in the
investigation of Mueller’s whereabouts and did little follow-up in the 1960s.
The remainder of the decade saw various news reports that Mueller had escaped
to various points in the West (Argentina, Cuba), as well as tragicomic
episodes. In 1967, a false sighting of Mueller in Panama led to the arrest
there of one Francis Keith, who was released once fingerprints revealed he was
not Mueller. Later the same year, two Israeli operatives were caught by West
German police in an attempted break-in at the Munich apartment of Mueller’s
wife. Reams of newspaper copy were produced by such episodes, but there was
only limited CIA interest.

Yet one particular report did catch CIA’s attention. In the aftermath of
the Eichmann trial, the West German weekly Stern ran two articles by the
journalist Peter Staehle that appeared in January and August 1964. Staehle said
that after having followed a path after the war that included the Soviet Union,
Romania, Turkey, and South Africa, Mueller became a senior police official in
Albania before fleeing for South America.23 From the very start, CIA
suspected that Staehle’s articles were a “plant” – part of a
“clever bit of [disinformation] work” to mislead the public, as well
as intelligence agencies.24 The CIA checked – and disproved
Staehle’s claim that Mueller was in fact an Albanian police official named
Abedin Bekir Nakoschiri.25 The BND and CIA also discovered that
Staehle had failed to get his articles printed in the more respected weekly Die
Zeit thanks to a suspect source base about which Staehle had reportedly lied.26

In May 1970 a Czech defector, very likely Ladislas Bittman [TN], a disinformation
specialist himself, weighed in.27 Bittman said that the Stern
article was planted from Prague in order to neutralize rumors that Mueller
might in fact be in Czechoslovakia. Bittman added for good measure that within
Czech intelligence circles, it was common knowledge that the KGB had used Nazi
war criminals for intelligence purposes and that key sections of Nazi archives
had also been captured by the Soviets for use in “operational aims.”28

These comments caught the eye of the CIA’s Counter-Intelligence (CI) Staff,
headed by the legendary James Angleton. If Mueller really had been in the USSR
or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and if he had taken RSHA central files with him
(many of which had indeed vanished after the war), then numerous leading West
Germans (presumably on the political right) could still be compromised. It was
crucial to discover what had happened, not necessarily to Mueller, who well
might have been dead in any case, but to the files. Angleton also had a special
interest in Soviet disinformation. The CI Staff undertook a through-going
inquiry of Mueller starting in late 1970, and it is likely that this inquiry
resulted in Mueller’s name file (along with the above-mentioned material on the
West German search) being assembled by CIA at all. It certainly resulted in a
forty-page Counter Intelligence Brief – “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo’
Mueller” – which was circulated as an internal report of the Directorate
of Plans in December 1971. A memo in the file dated 9 December 1971 explaining
the purpose of the report states that:

Our principal original
objective in preparing the attached study of the MUELLER case was to produce a
training aid illustrating the vagaries and pitfalls of protracted
investigations. In the past, MUELLER had been viewed mainly as a missing war
criminal. As the material was collected, however, we became aware of another
important possibility: that MUELLER had defected to World War II Soviet
counterintelligence (SMERSH) and had taken with him a large assortment of
files. (The central files of the German National Security Service (RSHA), of
which Mueller was de facto chief…in the last weeks of the war, were never
recovered by the Western Allies….) If SMERSH actually seized MUELLER and the
best part of the RSHA records, Soviet capabilities to control important Germans
and some other Europeans would far exceed those heretofore attributed to

In the process of putting together the report, the CI staff undertook some
new inquiries of its own. A re-reading of a 1963 article in the German weekly
Der Spiegel, which discussed the exhumation of Mueller’s West Berlin
“grave” that year, revealed that a mysterious woman in Berlin
unrelated to Mueller had purchased the headstone. 30 Perhaps this
purchase too was part of a disinformation campaign designed to hide the fact
that Mueller was used by the Soviets after the war.31 In December
1970 the West Germans allowed CIA to examine the exhumation records for the
identity of the mysterious woman who had purchased the Mueller tombstone,
albeit with no results. CI also hoped that the West German government would
locate and interview Walter Lueders (who had found the body buried in the
Grosse-Hamburgerstrasse cemetery) and verify, if they could, the authenticity
of the personal effects returned to Mueller’s family in 1957.32
German memoirs from the 1950s with cryptic clues on Mueller were reread.33
CI also asked Soviet defector Peter Deriabin to write a memorandum for the file
in November 1971.

The CI team found fault with how Goleniewski’s leads had been handled in
1961 and wanted to return to that trail. Loellgen, wrote one CI investigator,
“must have an interesting tale to tell about what happened to Heinrich
Mueller and how the [Soviet] operation to penetrate the Nazi stay-behind operation
fared”34 “How do we get Loellgen to talk?” asked
another. “Have we [an] interviewer that might ‘accidentally’ look [him]
up?” But reasons for skepticism remained. “It seems to me,” the
same agent said, “that [Soviet intelligence] would never have let LOELLGEN
go back to the West if in fact they had MUELLER. The scandal of sheltering this
number one war criminal would have been too risky.”35 In any
event, Loellgen was not questioned.

The 40-page CI report ended on a note of skepticism. “No one appears
to have tried very hard,” it said,

to find MUELLER immediately
after the war while the trail was still hot, either in the West or the
East….The presumption is that Allied officials searching for MUELLER soon
stumbled over the…holdings of his effects and the…burial record and considered
these sufficient proof that he was dead….There is little room for doubt,
however, that the Soviet and Czech services circulated rumors to the effect
that MUELLER had escaped to the West. These rumor were apparently floated to offset
the charges that the Soviets had sheltered the criminal….There are strong
indications but no proof that MUELLER collaborated with [the Soviets]. There
are also strong indications but no proof that MUELLER died [in Berlin]….One
thing appears certain. MUELLER and SCHOLZ had some special reason for entering
the Berlin death trap and remaining behind in the Chancellery. If their object
was to carry out a memorable and convincing suicide, they really bungled the

The CI Staff requested a deeper CIA investigation to find proof that would
confirm or disprove these competing theories. Yet it appears that the CI
Staff’s request for a full-fledged investigation of the Mueller matter was not
accepted.36 The Mueller file itself ends in December 1971 with the circulation
of the CI Staff report.

The Integrity of the CIA File

The heart of the file comprises documentary support for all the key
judgments in the 1971 CI Staff report “The Hunt for Gestapo Mueller.”
Whatever confidence one can have in the integrity of the file’s declassified
contents thus hinges on judgments regarding the CI Staff’s objectives in
assembling and writing its report. In 1971 the United States was not being
accused of having harbored Gestapo Mueller. Instead it seems that the CI Staff
was prompted to investigate the Mueller case both as a possible example of
Soviet deception and as a check on the reliability of key CIA defectors and
West German informants. If the CIA had evidence that Mueller had been contacted
by the West and not the Soviets, then the CI Staff’s handling of theses
defector cases that most likely involved Bittman, Deriabin, and Goleniewski
makes no sense. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the CIA was riddled with doubt
over the reliability of its stable of Soviet defectors. There were fears that
Moscow had sent agents to the West to mislead the Allies about Soviet
capabilities and intentions. It was in the interest of the CI Staff in
particular and the CIA in general to determine whether high profile defectors
like Bittman, Deriabin and Goleniewski were telling the truth about Mueller.
Moreover, in assembling materials for its report, the CI Staff had no reason to
believe that these documents would eventually be declassified. Therefore it is
reasonable to assume that the CI Staff report, and by extension the CIA Mueller
name file, represents a compilation of the best information on Gestapo Mueller
available to CIA at that time.

More information about Mueller’s fate might still emerge from still secret
files of the former Soviet Union. The CIA file, by itself, does not permit
definitive conclusions. Taking into account the currently available records of
the War Room as well as other documents in the National Archives, the authors
of this report conclude that Mueller most likely died in Berlin in early May

Notes of Sources Used Not from Mueller’s Name File

  • Excerpts
    from interrogation of Heinz Pannwitz, cited in CIA, Directorate of Plans,
    “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo Mueller,'” a Counterintelligence Brief
    issued in December 1971, CIA Name File, Heinrich Mueller, (hereafter
    Mueller File), vol. 2. The origins of this brief are explained below.
  • Walter
    Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, trans. Louis Hagen (New York: Harper
    Brothers, 1956 [1951]), pp. 319-20. Excerpts from the debriefing are in
    memo 201-742896 of 10 February 1965, Mueller file, vol. 1.
  • For
    Kaltenbrunner’s interrogation, see the excerpts in memo 201-742896 of 10
    February 1965, Mueller file, vol. 1. On Pannwitz, see [CIA/EUR] to Chief,
    EE and Chief SR, [A]-44835, 24 September 1959, Mueller file, vol. 1.
    Pannwitz’s name is redacted in this document but it is clear who he is
    from other evidence in the file.
  • War Room
    Publication, G. I. S. Priorities for Interrogation, 27 May 1945, NA RG
    226, Entry 119A, Box 22, Folder 621. War Room Publication, Tactical
    Interrogation of Members of the RSHA, 21 May 1945, NA RG 226, E119A, B 22,
    F 621.
  • W. R. C.3
    Fortnightly Report for the period ending 18th June, 1945, NA RG 226, E
    119A, B 25, F 639.
  • Progress
    Report, X-2 Branch, 1 June-30 June 1945, attached to Saint (London) to
    Saint, Stockholm, 13 July 1945, NA RG 226, Entry 125A, B 7, F 76.
  • War Room
    Monthly Summary No. 4, 23 July 1945, NA RG 226, E 119A, B 24, F 629.
  • NA RG 226,
    Entry 119A, B 22, F 621.
  • Arrest
    Target List-Revision Note, 1 November 1945, NA RG 226, E 122, B 1, tab 6.
  • Two
    consecutive index cards, probably prepared in 1946, are reproduced in
    Gestapo Mueller’s IRR File and give two birth dates: the correct date and
    7 June 1896. Card #2 includes the misinformation that Heinrich Mueller was
    being detained at Civilian Internment Enclosure #10, Altenstadt. It is
    quite possible that a Heinrich Mueller was there, but neither of those two
    whose birth dates were listed. U.S. Army did not list any further dealings
    with the Altenstadt Mueller. NA RG 319, IRR File Mueller, File XE 23 55
  • See note by
    the Intelligence Bureau, C.C. G. (British Element), Bad Oeynhausen to G-2
    (CI), USFET, 23 May 1946. There is also a reference to this information in
    “Subject: Mueller, Heinrich,”5 May 1961, the same U.S. Army
    consolidated report that lists Mueller as having been in Altenstadt in
    December 1945. NA RG 319, IRR File Mueller, XE 23 55 39. This report was
    easily dismissed because Gestapo Mueller’s wife and children were still
  • See Cards
    photocopied in the U.S. Army’s Mueller File. NA RG 319, IRR File Mueller,
    XE 23 55 39.
  • See
    “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo Mueller,'” p. 12.
  • The 1950
    book, Die geheime Front: Organisation, Personen und Aktionen der deutschen
    Geheimdienstes was published under the pseudonym Walter Hagen and
    translated into numerous languages including English. It argued that
    Mueller had escaped through a secret passageway known only to him and
  • On the
    paragraph above see Landeskriminalamt Baden-W&#uuml;rttemberg,
    Sonderkommission Zentrale Stelle, Tgb. Nr. SK. ZSt. III/I-79/60, 29 July
    1960 to Barnett at the U.S. Consulate, IRR, XE 23 55 39; Landeskriminalamt
    Baden-W&#uuml;rtemmberg Sonderkommission Zentrale Stelle, SK ZSt.
    I/1-79/60 to Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, 27 February 1961, ibid. The U.S.
    Army helped for ninety days beginning in May 1961 with the surveillance of
    Mueller’s father and children, but this surveillance yielded no results.
  • The
    witnesses, questioned in connection with a West German police
    investigation in 1961, are quoted in “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo
    Mueller,'” pp. 16, 18.
  • [CIA/EUR]
    to Chief, EE and Chief SR, [A]-44835, 24 September 1959, Mueller file,
    vol. 1.
  • On the
    details above, see the lengthy German police reports of 1960 and 1961
    submitted to U.S. Army Counter Intelligence and contained in Mueller’s IRR
    file, NA RG 319, IRR File Mueller, XE 23 55 39. Fainter copies of these
    reports were made available by the Army to the CIA in 1970 and are
    included in the CIA Mueller File, vol. 2; See also “The Hunt for
    ‘Gestapo Mueller,'” pp.19-26, 32-3, 34-37. On the effects, see
    “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo Mueller'”, p. 33.
  • Memo
    [A]-744, 10 May 1961, Mueller file, vol. 2; Memo of 17 March 1961, Mueller
    File, vol. 2. The defector’s name is redacted.
  • To: Chief,
    EE, Chief SR, A[Excised] LCIMPROVE/[Excised]/[Excised] /Operations Further
    [Excised] Reports on Rote Kapelle Personalities, 24 September 1959,
    Mueller File, Vol. 1. The informant is revealed by name as Pannwitz in
    “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo Mueller,'” pp. 14-16, Mueller File,
    Volume 2.
  • On Felfe,
    see Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection
    (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press, 1990), pp. 143-72. On
    Loellgen’s non-arrest, see Review of File: Jakob LOELLGEN, 9 February
    1971, Mueller File, vol. 2.
  • See
    CIA/Eur, June 23, 1961 in Mueller file , vol. 1. Regarding the defector’s
    comments in 1971 see “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo Mueller,'” pp. 25,
    25a and the Memorandum for the Record of 18 November 1971 in Mueller file,
    vol. 1. This defector had never seen Mueller himself.
  • “Gestapo-M&#uuml;ller
    lebt in Albanien,” Stern, January 1964; “Die Spur
    f&#uuml;hrt nach S&#uuml;damerika,” Stern, 16 August 1964.
    The latter article in full is xeroxed in Mueller file, vol. 1.
  • On the
    possibility of disinformation, see [CIA/EUR] dispatch [A] – 3564 CS, 31
    January 1964.
  • Memo [A]-13564,
    31 January 1964, Mueller file, vol. 1.
  • [CIA/EUR]
    to Chief, EE, [A]-63831, 5 February 1964.
  • Staff
    memorandum December 9, 1970, Mueller File, Volume 1. This is a debriefing
    of a defector with inside knowledge of Czech intelligence and KGB active
    measures. The 1971 CI Staff history further identifies this source as an
    apparently reliable Czechoslovak defector. See “The Hunt for ‘Gestapo
    Mueller,'” p. 38. The information which this defector provided and
    the timing of this defection strongly suggests that this source was
    Ladislas Bittman.[TN]
  • Memo
    [A]-19267, 9 December 1970, Mueller file, vol. 1.
  • The 9
    December 1971 memo is in Mueller file, vol. 2.
  • “Gestapo-M&#uuml;ller
    – Kein Nazi,” Der Spiegel, 16 October 1963, copy in Mueller file.
  • Chief,
    WOMUSE, via Chief, EUR, to [CIA/EUR], [CIA/EUR] 22899, 7 October 1970,
    Mueller file, vol. 1.
  • Memo
    [CIA/EUR] 22984, 15 December 1970, Mueller file, vol 1.
  • See the
    xeroxed copies of Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, and Hagen, Die geheime
    Front, dated December 1970 in Mueller file, vol. 1.
  • Memorandum
    for the Record, 10 February 1971, “The Man who probably knows what
    became of Heinrich (Gestapo) Mueller,” Mueller File, vol. 2.
  • “How
    do we get LOELLGEN to talk?” 10 February 1971, Mueller file, vol 2.
  • As a part
    of the CI Staff’s investigation, the CIA requested files from the U.S.
    Army on some of Mueller’s associates. Those documents were released to
    NARA, but are largely illegible.

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